In many areas of society we rely on competition to better achieve societal goals. Ideally, competition motivates effort and efficiently allocates resources. However, due to imperfect information, competition generally depends on quantitative proxy measures in order to assess performance. This leads to an increasing use of such quantitative proxies in modern societies. Examples include: in science, the publication count of an author, in healthcare, the number of patients treated or in business, the profit achieved. Importantly, some practices may optimize proxy performance but not the actual societal goal. In such cases, individual decisions and cultural practices may shift away from the societal goal and toward the proxy. Such processes have been described by a law attributed to Charles Goodhart or Donald T. Campbell, most pithily phrased as: 'When a measure becomes a target it ceases to be a good measure.' While the original mentions of this law address policy determination or education respectively, we propose it applies to any competitive societal system: Any proxy measure in a competitive societal system becomes a target for the competing individuals (or groups). Here, we construct an agent based model to explore the basic components and dynamics of such a process. The model combines an effort incentivization mechanism from economic multitasking theory and contest theory with a slower process of cultural evolution.
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